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Abstract
Since Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2004), it has been supported that inequality,
measured at national level, does not aﬀect the risk of conﬂict. Based on a re-
newed theoretical framework, the purpose of the paper is to explore the role
of inequality in localized conﬂicts. We argue that previous ﬁndings might be
biased by the myopic nature of cross-country analysis. Consistently with the
model, Probit estimations indicate that income inequality measured at munici-
pal level was signiﬁcant in motivating people to support the rebellion in South
Mexico. At this geographical level, we also ﬁnd an increase in income per capita
could exacerbate the risk of conﬂict in a situation where the rebel leader would
have greater incentives to loot the local production compared to the opportu-
nity cost associated with ﬁghting for the worker.
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It is commonly argued that increasing inequality leads to conﬂict or revolution. This argu-
ment has been deepened by Gurr (1970) who supports that collective violence was driven
by relative deprivation, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between what a social group believes it
deserves and what it really gets to live. Even Sen (1997, 1) suggests in his exposed moti-
vations to study further the issue of inequality that “the relation between inequality and
rebellion is indeed a closed one, and its runs both ways. That a perceived sense of inequity is
a common ingredient of rebellion in societies is clear enough”. However, this relation seems
to be nothing more than an assertion. Russett (1964) and Muller (1985) already underlined
how this argument is deeply rooted in the works of authors such as Karl Marx or Alexis de
Tocqueville, but clearly lacks empirical support. 1 With the means of non-linear models,
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) have seminally renewed the empirical analysis on the causes of
conﬂict. Extending their ﬁrst analysis, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) found that measures of
social grievances such as income inequality do not systematically aﬀect the risk of conﬂict.
By sharp contrast, measures of greed such as economic decline are found to be signiﬁcant.
2 Collier (2000, 10) concludes that “inequality does not seem to aﬀect the risk of conﬂict.
Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the poor”. The non-signiﬁcance of income inequal-
ity measured by the Gini coeﬃcient is corroborated by Fearon and Latin (2003). This result
has been much debated by authors such as Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) or Stewart (2000)
who ﬁnd a positive relationship between income inequality and the occurrence of civil war.
However, the period investigated by Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) is clearly shorter than
the other studies and no detailed results are provided to support their statement. Stewart
(2000) adopts another type of research design as she illustrates her concept of horizontal
inequality through the study of Uganda and widens the notion of inequality to social and
political dimensions. Comparison is diﬃcult as she did not seem to test econometrically the
signiﬁcance of her estimates of horizontal inequalities. The purpose of this paper is then to
explore how inequality could motivate people to rebel or at least, to support a rebellion by
studying its role in South Mexico.
The paper argues that ﬁnding no signiﬁcance of income inequality is not highly surprising
and is even misleading. On the one hand, despite their theoretical foundations emphasizing
the cost-beneﬁt calculus undertaken by individuals, these cross-country studies overlook in-
dividual motivations. Local factors are likely to be determinant in explaining localized or
intra-national insurrections. For instance, we can doubt that the decision to support the re-
bellion in South Mexico will be as much inﬂuenced by the diﬀerence of welfare with someone
1As far as we know, Russett (1964) is the ﬁrst to have approached this relationship by using
the Gini coeﬃcient as a measure of the total inequality of a distribution. Both authors use multiple
regressions to emphasize that several factors might inﬂuence an uprising.
2Since Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), distinguishing greed and grievance has become common in the
economic literature on conﬂict. Grievance is deﬁned as “a motivation based on a sense of injustice
in the way a social group is treated, often with a strong historical dimension” while greed, an
economic opportunity but characterized as “an acquisitive desire similar to crime, albeit often on a
much larger scale”(Murshed, 2002, 189). This paper aims at going beyond this debate by considering
how the possible greedy leaders might manipulate the grievances of others (Keen, 2001).
1living far in the North compared with someone being located in the closed neighborhood.
Although bearing the obvious advantage of generalization, standard cross-country studies
are too myopic to explore how local perceptions of inequality might aﬀect the probability
to support a rebellion. 3 On the other hand, most econometric analysis on the subject
refer to some standard models in the economics of conﬂict to motivate the choice of their
explanatory variables. However, empirical results are hardly shown to be consistent with
the theoretical framework underlying their work. A noticeable exception is the recent paper
of Olsson (2007). Furthermore, these models seem more relevant in explaining state-wide
civil war. In section 2, we propose a renewed theoretical model, more adequate to study the
causes of localized conﬂicts. We emphasize the need to approach both relative and absolute
deprivations in a common framework. It also provides a possible reconciliation between
an economic approach emphasizing the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion and a view
more often encountered in political sciences for which larger resources increase the potential
pay-oﬀs for the warring parties. the empirical implication is that ignoring one dimension
could bias the estimate of the other. Also dealing with other sources of endogeneity, section
3 empirically tests how income inequality and income per capita could motivate people to
rebel or at least, to support the rebellion by studying its role in South Mexico. Our results
are consistent with the main predictions of the theoretical model.
To check the robustness of our analysis, other factors of conﬂict would need to be tested.
Of particular interest in the literature is the role of ethnic distinction in motivating peo-
ple to ﬁght. Although the primordialist approach predicting a struggle among old identities
following the end of the Cold War has been dismissed due to its simplistic conception of
ethnicity, the formation of groups often follows ethnic distinctions. Perceived or real diﬀer-
ences between groups are often used or manipulated by leaders for mobilization. A relative
consensus in the literature seems to emerge according to which ethnic distinctions alone are
not suﬃcient to bring groups to violent mobilization but can be used as a resource to gain
political power and economic resources (Turton, 1997). These distinctions remain crucial
when combined with sources of political, social or economic grievances, even when they are
socially and historically constructed or exaggerated. Section 3.4.2 will discuss the robustness
of our results to alternative measurements of ethnicity and to the inclusion of other control
variables.
2 The model
Most empirical works on the subject usually make some distant reference to the standard
models in the economics of conﬂict such as Grossman (1991, 1999), Hirshleifer (1995, 2001) or
Skaperdas (1992). However, consistency of the empirical results with theoretical foundations
are rarely veriﬁed. For example, based on Grossman (1991, 1999), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004)
found that income per capita, assumed to be a proxy for greed, explains better the risk of
conﬂict than income inequality which is assumed to be a proxy for grievance. However,
3Cramer (2003) also argues that national measures of inequality can also be misleading, partic-
ularly in the case of low-intensity guerilla insurrection or localized rebellion. However, contrarily
to this author, we do not reject the quantitative approach to inequality measurement.
2the same Grossman (1999) showed theoretically that the probability of conﬂict would only
depend on the realization of a random variable reﬂecting the relative eﬀectiveness of the
rebels compared to the army soldiers. Consistency with the theory would have implied
that income per capita should be insigniﬁcant, too. 4 Furthermore, the superiority of the
greed variable on the grievance variable results from the comparison of two models, as the
income per capita and income inequality are estimated in distinct regressions. Given the fact
that one variable could impact on the other, it raises some obvious problems of potential
endogeneity. At least, we need a theoretical model that would explicitly distinguish the
eﬀects of absolute wealth and inequality.
The model is inspired by Grossman (1999) and has a similar general equilibrium ﬂavor.
However, three major changes seek to make it more applicable to localized conﬂicts. First,
the army recruitment is not done within the conﬂicting area. Being a soldier is not one
of the choices of the worker. On the contrary, Grossman (1999) allows the worker to be a
soldier and a rebel at the same time. Since the recruitment is then done uniquely within
the conﬂicting area, the cost or return of recruiting an additional rebel is then always equal
to the cost or return of recruiting an additional soldier. This simpliﬁes the computation
but also cancels out some interesting eﬀects. Departing from this assumption will allow the
level of wealth to have a diﬀerentiated eﬀect on the level of deterrence and on the potential
rebel forces. A second major diﬀerence refers to the behavior of the rebel leader. The leader
is recognized as an entrepreneur but, contrary to Grossman (1999), he is not benevolent in
the sense he does not necessarily maximize the welfare of his supporters. This view is at the
core of many political economic analysis of conﬂict where the economic agenda of the rebel
leader has often overcome political motivates. War is, above all, an instrument to achieve
other means but is not an end in itself. Many rebel leaders have accumulated a massive
amount of resources in wartimes. An obvious candidate for looting is the appropriation
of natural resources such as diamonds in e.g. Angola, Congo and Liberia (Fairhead, 2000;
Billon, 2001; Olsson, 2007) or Sierra Leone (Richards, 1996). Other economic motives could
be observed such as the control of illegal trade, e.g. drug smuggling in Afghanistan (Rubin,
2000), the control of land in Somalia and Iraq (Keen, 1993) or the exploitation of cheaper
labour in Sudan (Keen, 1994). The modeling implication is that the rebel leader will simply
maximize the rent he can capture in wartimes. Similar to Grossman (1999) and contrary
to Roemer (1988), the rebel leader is able to exclude non-participants from beneﬁting from
its ﬁghting loot but his objective is to maximize its expected net income, not necessarily
the one of his supporters. Another implication is that the rebel leader does not need a ﬁnal
victory against the ruler to receive a positive pay-oﬀ from warfare. This conforms with the
general observation that parties engaged in conﬂict may beneﬁt from persistent warfare.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom of two parties ﬁghting to win against each other, war
has paradoxically lead to some kind of cooperation between the parties. War could persist
under equilibrium, the two ﬁghting parties actually colluding at the expense of the most
4The interpretation given by Fearon and Latin (2003) of the income per capita as a proxy for the
state’s overall ﬁnancial, administrative, police and military capabilities would be more consistent
with the underlying theoretical model. Before all, it underlines the need to stick to a model at the
time of interpreting the coeﬃcient of such a variable.
3vulnerable citizens. We will be mostly interested in these situations where no side is able
to completely eradicate the other one. Finally, we introduce distributional considerations,
by allowing the government to give a ﬁnancial incentive to the potential ﬁghter to work
rather than ﬁght. Such possibility to pay for peace is consistent with the theoretical models
of Azam (1995), Azam and Mesnard (2003) and Noh (2002). According to these authors,
the government does not only use the military forces to deter conﬂict but could actually
combine it with a distributive policy in favor of their opponents. The ﬁrst authors report
the example of Houphou¨ et-Boigny, former president of Cˆ ote-d’Ivoire who taxes his own
ethnic group, the Akan cocoa and coﬀee growers to ﬁnance public infrastructure and other
redistributive policies in favor of other ethnic groups. Despite some common feature, our
model diﬀers from Noh (2002) in the way we model the transfer from the ruler to the worker
and not directly to the rebel leader. Therefore, we restrict the peace-enhancing role of
redistribution, as fostering local production also increases the potential loot of the rebel
leader.
Figure 1: Sequence of decisions
The model identiﬁes three decision-making agents : a representative worker, a unique
rebel leader and a central government. The model assigns particular objectives to these
agents, the strategies available to them and their constraints. As shown in ﬁgure 1, these
agents make their decisions sequentially. In this game, the government is the Stackelberg
leader. It will ﬁrst decide the level of deterrence, the level of tax and the labour subsidy
in order to maximize the total wealth produced on its territory. Then, the rebel leader will
decide to recruit or not some rebels. Finally, the worker will decide how to allocate his time.
At the end of the sequence, the local producer simply adjusts, on a mechanistic way, its
production and the wage according to the supply of labour.
2.1 The worker-ﬁghter decision
The representative worker seeks to maximize his net income. He allocates his endowment
of time, normalized to 1, between working for the producers, supporting the rebellion, and
working informally for himself. The support to the rebellion does not necessarily need to be
ﬁghting but could be spending time participating to meetings and protestations, spreading
the propaganda of the rebellion, etc. Throughout the model, we assume a technology of
production of the one-factor form : Y = 1
αALα, with 0 < α < 1 indicating a decreasing
marginal utility of work. For comparability with the model of Noh (2002), the parameter
4A reﬂects the productivity of the production. We also assume that the local producer will
only adjust the production and the wage to the time allocated to labour by the worker.
Therefore, the labour wage is given by the marginal productivity of labour ALα−1. Based
on these assumptions, the net income of the representative worker is represented as follows:
E = (1 + s)wlL + wiI + γH
s.t.
L + I + H = 1
L,I,H ≥ 0
γ > 0
0 < α < 1
(1)
L is the time allocated to working ; I is the time allocated to supporting the rebellion ; H is
the time allocated to informal activities ; wl is the labour wage ; wi is the reward provided for
supporting the rebellion ; s gives the ﬁnancial incentive (subsidy) given by the government
to go to work ; α is the elasticity of the marginal product of time allocated to production
work ; γ is the marginal return to time allocated to informal activities. The worker will
maximize its expected income with respect to L, I and H. He will take the compensation
wage oﬀered by the rebel leader, and the employment subsidy introduced by the government
as given. Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
L = A
1
1−α

α
γ
(1 + s)
 1
1−α
or L = 0
wi ≥ γ or I = 0
H = 1 − L − I
(2)
The solution gives the equilibrium value of L in reaction to s. We assume the non-
negativity constraint for H is not binding. In other words, γ is large enough for this con-
straint not to bind in equilibrium. When the rebellion reward is larger or equal to γ, the
marginal product of time allocated to informal activities, the supply of rebel forces will be
perfectly elastic. Given the reaction function of the worker, we derive the labour wage and
the corresponding production level.
wl =

α
γ
(1 + s)
−1
Y =
1
α
A
1
1−α

α
γ
(1 + s)
 α
1−α
(3)
52.2 The rebel leader decision
We assume there is only one rebel leader who has the necessary skills to motivate people
to rebel. However, these skills will not be enough to overcome collective action problems.
Contrary to Grossman (1999), he has to face the costs in organizing the rebellion. These
coordination costs increase with the number of ﬁghters (protesters). Furthermore, the leader
is not benevolent regarding his supporters. He only maximizes his own net income under
a cost constraint. The rebel leader will capture a rent even when he has not overthrown
the central ruler. We follow the technology of revolution given by Grossman (1999). In this
setting, (1 − λ) captures the way the rebel leader is able to loot the local production. His
potential loot will be proportional to the support he gets from workers and to the eﬃciency
of his looting technology (material and immaterial). The leader is constraint as he has to
pay a compensation wage to the workers suﬃciently high to make them allocate parts of
their time to the support of the rebellion. The fact he pays a compensation wage rather than
sharing his rent among ﬁghters is an important diﬀerence compared to previous models. The
problem of the rebel leader is as follows:
J = (1 − λ)Y − wiI − cI
where λ =
1
1 + θI
D
(4)
Y represents the output produced locally ; c covers the coordination costs faced by the rebel
leader ; (1 − λ) is the potential ability of the rebel leader to capture a rent, i.e. part of Y ;
θ gives the eﬃciency of the rebels relative to the deterrence forces. θ reﬂects factors such as
the skills of the rebels to coordinate the rebellion, the support from a foreign government or
the military advantage exogenously given by the nature of the battleﬁeld. The rebel leader
maximizes his net income with respect to I, the number of ﬁghters (supporters) he will have
to compensate. He will consider the compensation wage, the variable cost of coordinating
the uprising, the technology of looting and the value of θ as given. Using the reaction
functions (2) and (3), the following solution is obtained :
I(s,D) =
s
DA
1
1−α
αθ(c + γ)

α
γ
(1 + s)
 α
1−α
−
D
θ
for D < ˆ D
I(s,D) = 0 for D ≥ ˆ D
ˆ D =
θY
c + γ
(5)
The interior solution is found when D < ˆ D, i.e. the minimum level of military action
necessary to deter the potential revolutionary leader to coordinate an uprising. It is an
increasing function of θ and Y in the sense the more eﬃcient the insurgents are and the
greater the potential loot is, the greater the deterrence action should be to achieve the
necessary condition to deter the uprising. The inverse relationship is found with c. The
6greater the coordination costs are, the lower the necessary deterrence should be to avoid
war.
2.3 The government decision
The objective of the government is to maximize the total wealth produced on its territory.
A speciﬁcity of this model is that the government can achieve this objective by paradoxically
taxing the local producers. Indeed, they will use this tax revenue to pay for peace, that is
to say, to increase the incentives of the workers to work rather than support the rebellion.
The government will also decide which level of deterrence it will release at a variable cost φ.
5 The ruling government takes the compensation wage, the technology of looting λ and the
exogenous variable θ as given. The government also considers exogenously the technology
of production of the local producers. The objective function of the government is deﬁned as
follows :
Q = (1 − τ)λY
s.t. τλY ≥ swlL + φD
(6)
The ﬁrst decision made by the central government is the determination of the deterrence
action, D. The government seeking to maximize the local production will react proportion-
ally to the resources of the local producers under risk of looting. Taking into account the
direct eﬀect of D on λ and the indirect eﬀect of D on λ via I, the equilibrium level of
deterrence action, when it is lower than ˆ D, is as follows :
D =
(γ + c)
4αθφ2 A
1
1−α

α
γ
(1 + s)
 α
1−α
if 0 < D < ˆ D
(7)
Given (5) and (7), the level of support to the rebellion can be re-expressed.
I(s) =

1 −
(γ + c)
2θφ

1
2αθφ
A
1
1−α

α
γ
(1 + s)
 α
1−α
when θ >
(γ + c)
2φ
I(s) = 0, otherwise
(8)
The minimum level of military forces necessary to deter rebellion presented in (5) is
equivalent to the feasibility condition shown in (8). For the rebellion to be feasible, the rebel
5Unlike Grossman (1999), we do not introduce directly the army forces into the government’s
preferences. Despite its costs, having a large army should not necessarily aﬀect negatively the
government’s preferences.
7leader should be suﬃciently eﬃcient to overcome the coordination costs and the marginal
beneﬁt of informal activities. This condition is most easily met when the cost of deterrence
is high. The government will also decide the equilibrium level of subsidy to be given to
the worker. The government is constrained in his objective as the subsidy will need to be
ﬁnanced by a tax on production.
s =
c + γ
4θφ
− (1 − α) and s ≥ 0 if θ ≤
c + γ
4φ(1 − α)
s ≥ 0 with I > 0 only if α >
1
2
τ =
α + 1
2
− (1 − α)
2αθφ
c + γ
and τ ≥ 0 if θ ≤
(α + 1)(c + γ)
4α(1 − α)φ
(9)
As shown in ﬁgure 2, the conditions under which the subsidy and the tax are positive,
are met under the feasibility condition provided the marginal utility of labour is high enough
(α > 1/2). Otherwise, using a subsidy is a too costly strategy for the government. When θ
belongs to the interval [
c+γ
4φ(1−α),
(1+α)(c+γ)
4αφ(1−α) [, the government would only use the deterrence
action. For θ above this interval, the government cannot resist anymore the uprising as it can
use neither the soft nor the hard deterrence strategies and keep positive levels of production.
This would be most likely to happen if the marginal utility of labour is very high. In the
empirical work, we will consider the second interval where war is feasible ; no party is able
to completely eradicate the other ; and the subsidy might be a valuable strategy to deter
conﬂict.
Given (9), condition (8) can be re-written.
I∗ =

1 −
(γ + c)
2θφ

A
1
1−α
2αθφ

α
γ

(c + γ)
4θφ
+ α
 α
1−α
when θ >
(γ + c)
2φ
I∗ = 0, otherwise
(10)
Computing w∗
l , L∗, Y ∗ and π∗, one can express the ratio of income between the local
producers and the workers to capture a sense of inequality. A measure of absolute wealth
per capita is obtained by dividing the equilibrium production by the numbers of workers.
π∗
w∗
l
= A
1
1−α

α
γ
(c + γ)
4θφ
+ α)
 1
1−α 
(1 − α)(γ + c)
4αθφ
− α

Y ∗
L∗ =
1
α

α
γ
(c + γ)
4θφ
+ α)
−1
(11)
8Figure 2: Range of parameters of interest
Therefore, condition (10) can be written in a more intuitive way.
I∗ =
1
2αφθ

π∗
w∗
l

Y ∗
L∗

1 −
(γ + c)
2θφ

(1 − α)(c + γ)
4α2θφ
− 1

when θ >
(γ + c)
2φ
(12)
When the feasibility condition is met and if we restrict ourselves to the case where s > 0
(i.e. α > 1/2), the equilibrium level of rebel forces is : 6
• increasing in π
∗
w∗
l . Increased inequality should be associated with more support to the
rebellion. An increase in relative deprivation reduces the opportunity cost associated
of joining a rebellion and hence raises the risk of local conﬂict.
• increasing in Y
∗
L∗ . Contrary to common wisdom, when controlling for the inequality
level, an increase in income per capita could increase the support to the rebellion.
This results from the fact that the opportunity eﬀect being embodied by the inequality
term, the income per capita only captures the looting eﬀect. In other words, the larger
is the production to loot, the keener the rebel leader is to hire ﬁghters.
6The last term is interesting as it could be seen as a corrective term on GDP, reﬂecting whether
the government is benevolent or not. A framework where the government is corrupted and only
concerned about the net income of its clientele is given in appendix. In such a case, the subsidy is
never a valuable strategy when the war is feasible.
9• decreasing in c and γ. An increase in the coordination costs of organizing the uprising
or of the marginal utility of informal activities would also decrease the equilibrium
level of rebel forces.
• increasing in θ (when θ satisﬁed the feasibility condition). In other words, the relative
eﬃciency increases the rebel forces. The same relationship holds for φ. However, when
φ is too low, no rebellion can be organized as using deterrence is a very cheap strategy
for the government. An increase in the cost of the deterrence action satisfying the
feasibility condition, increases the incentives to expand the rebellion.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Conﬂicts in South Mexico
On January 1, 1994, Chiapas attracted international attention when the Ejercic´ ıo
Zapatista de Liberaci´ on Nacional (EZLN) chose the date of the launch of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to occupy seven cities in this Mexican
State. A ten-day confrontation occurred between the small group of rebels and the
Mexican army, resulting in more than one hundred Zapatistas dead. However, this
apparently short length of 10 days should not underestimate the conﬂict. On the one
hand, the violence existed long before this event and went on even after the peak of the
conﬂict in 1994. Particularly, the low-intensity but highly eﬀective warfare conducted
against the Zapatistas makes less clear the conventional distinction between peace
and war times. Casanova (1996, 281) indicates that “from 1974 to 1987, 982 leaders
were assassinated; 1,084 peasants arrested without legal cause; 379 seriously wounded;
505 kidnapped or tortured; 334 disappeared; 38 women raped, ...”. After 1994, the
violence continued. In 1995, President Zedillo ordered a new military oﬀensive in
order to arrest the alleged EZLN leaders. The oﬀensive failed but was the source of a
new wave of violence and forced displacement against indigenous people. In 1997, 45
Zapatistas were massacred in Acteal by paramilitaries. On the other hand, reducing
the conﬂict to a period of ten days might give birth to misleading interpretations
emphasizing the irrational nature of these violent events. 7 We will enlarge our
analysis to two other states. Guerrero also hosted revolutionary movements through
the emergence in the mid-nineties of the Ejercic´ ıo Popular Revolucionar´ ıo (EPR). No
signiﬁcant uprising is known in the third state, Puebla.
South Mexico and Chiapas are interesting cases for studying the role of inequality in
conﬂict. Inequality appears to be the usual suspect but not necessarily, for objective
reasons. Due to the symbolic synchronization with the launch of the NAFTA, many
authors and leaders of the rebellion themselves have argued that the conﬂict in Chiapas
was not just about this state but also against the whole neoliberal project, source
7Promoting an approach of continuity in the study of conﬂict, authors such as Galtung (1996) or
Keen (2000) underline that the distinction between peace and war times is not so clear, as processes
of exploitation and marginalization already existing in normal times are just reinforced in war times.
10of inequalities. Since Benjamin (1989) and his book “A Rich Land, a Poor People”,
inequality between Chiapas and the rest of Mexico and a subsequent feeling of injustice
have often been pointed out as a source of social discontent and rebellion (Duterme,
1998; Korsbaek, 1994; Morton, 2002). The same argument has been advanced as far as
Guerrero is concerned. The contrast between high-value natural resources and poverty
is unfortunately right. However, the short cut rich land-poor people as a source of
conﬂict seems pretty weak. First, state inequalities in Mexico have historically been
very high. GDP per capita in Chiapas and Guerrero were at least three times lower
than the richest states, Mexico City and Nuevo Leon in 1970. After 30 years, this ratio
has even doubled in 2000. The gap between some Southern states and the rest of the
country has clearly widened since the mid-1980s, beginning of the entry into GATT,
not only in terms of income per capita but also in terms of education achievement,
life expectancy, etc. 8 However, this relative correlation is not a guarantee of causal
inference. Put broadly, Chiapas and Guerrero were poorer than the rest of the country
in 1970 and its inhabitants are still poorer now. The observed correlation does not
explain why conﬂict occurs there and not in other poor states such as Oaxaca, Tlaxcala,
Veracruz-Llave, Tabasco, Michoacan or Puebla. Second, it does not really explain
why people decided to enter into conﬂict. As explained in section 3.4.2, Chiapas and
Guerrero are far too heterogeneous to form one group in itself and overcome collective
action problems. It is of utmost importance to understand individual motivations and
explore the role of inequality at a more disaggregated level.
3.2 Methodology and data
A Probit model is constructed to estimate the eﬀects of the explanatory variables on
the probability of people to support or not the rebellion. The model to be estimated
is based on the conditional probability of y given a vector of regressors x:
P(y = 1|x) = Φ(β0 + β1INEQUALITY + β3INCOME + β3ETHNICITY
+β4SIZE + β5DENSITY + β6CONTROL + ε)
where Φ is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Under
the standard assumption of normality of the error terms (ε), coeﬃcients are estimated
by conditional maximum likelihood. Given the limits of cross-country analysis, a par-
ticular focus is given to local factors in understanding conﬂict in South Mexico. Data
were collected at the municipal level on the basis of population census from the Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica Geograf´ ıa y Informat´ ıca (INEGI). The municipality is
the smallest administrative unit in Mexico and hosts an average of 25,000 habitants
in our sample. Data from 1970 are collected to introduce instrumental variables. To
improve robustness in our analysis and as illustrated in ﬁgure 3, the sample is ex-
tended to two other states, Guerrero and Puebla. Rebel movements are recorded in
8This has been widely studied by notably Cikurel (2002), Rodr´ ıguez-Pose and Reaza (2002) and
Tamayo-Flores (2001).
11the former and not in the later. The sample is composed of 402 municipalities. As can
be seen in table 1, these Southern states share common characteristics, being among
the poorest states in Mexico and hosting a high percentage of people speaking an
indigenous language.
Table 1: Three similar states
Income per capita ($pesos) People speaking an indigenous languages (%)
Mexico (country) 11338 7.49
Chiapas (110 muni) 6771 26.42
Guerrero (74 muni) 7572 13.40
Puebla (217 muni) 8661 14.11
Source: INEGI, Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica Geograf´ ıa y Inform´ atica, data for 1990
Figure 3: Chiapas, Guerrero and Puebla
Note: The dark hatching indicates states out of the sample. Light hatching describes the states of which munici-
palities have been used for computing the index of inequality spillovers (see footnote 12)
Source: Geographic coordinates provided by CIMMYT (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center)
3.2.1 Dependent variable : support to the rebellion
Working with so small geographical units, a diﬃcult task is the determination of the
dependent variable, i.e. whether or not a municipality is deﬁned as supportive to the
rebellion. For Chiapas, two indicators are used. On the one hand, Sonnleitner (2001)
by studying in details the way the EZLN injunction to vote for the Partido de la
Revoluc´ ıon Democrat´ ıco (PRD) candidate in 1994 and not to vote between 1995 and
121997 was followed, identiﬁes 18 municipalities with a strong concentration of Zap-
atista supporters. On the other hand, Trejo (2002) investigates to which extend Za-
patista Autonomous Municipalities (Municipios Aut´ onomos Zapatistas, MAZ) have
been created between 1994 and 1997. These MAZ are “de facto local governments
that claim legitimate jurisdiction over newly deﬁned territories within constitution-
ally elected mayors, governors and the President of Mexico and declare themselves
only accountable to their Zapatista base communities and to the EZLN commanders
in chief” (Trejo, 2002, 7). This author calculates a strong correlation between these
rebel jurisdictions and the levels of violence that occur at the local level. This second
indicator completes the sub-sample of ‘supportive’ municipalities with an additional
unit, Tital´ a.
For Guerrero also hosting social unrest conducted by the EPR, the dependent variable
was deﬁned on the basis of the events of confrontations, murders and rapes exacted by
the army soldiers against ‘supposed’ rebels and reported as such by the local press be-
tween 1995 and 1998, the peak of the conﬂict in that state (SIPAZ, 2005). The method
is based on the assumptions that rebels are hidden where they ﬁnd enough supporters
and that exactions from soldiers make the population more likely to support the EPR.
Eleven municipalities are determined as ‘supportive’ out of 74. No signiﬁcant uprising
is known in Puebla so that we end up with a sample of 402 municipalities, of which
30 are considered ‘supportive’ to local rebels. Those municipalities are represented in
ﬁgure 4.
3.2.2 Explanatory variables
We follow the equilibrium condition found in (12) to identify and interpret our main
explanatory variables. We assume the conditions are such that the war is feasible and
the marginal utility of labour is suﬃciently high to make labour subsidy a valuable
strategy to deter conﬂict. In such a case, the following explanatory variables are
deﬁned :
Inequality : We should expect habitants of unequal municipalities to be more sup-
portive to the rebellion. However, it is only true provided we control at the same time
for the looting eﬀect captured by the income per capita. The Gini coeﬃcient and the
polarization index of Esteban and Ray (1994) were estimated for each municipality.
The later is argued to be much more signiﬁcant in the study of conﬂicts. As argued
by Esteban and Ray (1994, 820), “the phenomenon of polarization is closely linked to
the generation of tension, to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and
to the existence of social unrest in general”.
Income per capita : Condition (12) indicates that conditional on other variables, the
level of production per capita should have a positive eﬀect on the support to the
rebellion. Contrary to Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), an increase of the income per
capita could therefore boost the potential loot the rebel leader could get from warfare
(when controlling for the distributional eﬀect of an increase in income per capita).
The theoretical model underlines the necessity to study the eﬀects of both income per
13Figure 4: 402 municipalities, of which 30 are ‘supportive’
Note: Municipalities in pink are those not assumed to be ‘supportive’ to the rebellion, while those with blue dots
are assumed to be ‘supportive’.
Source: Geographic coordinates provided by CIMMYT (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center)
capita and the Gini coeﬃcient simultaneously. A logarithm transformation has been
applied to this variable.
Ethnicity as a coordination cost : Condition (12) indicates that the support to the
rebellion is negatively correlated to the coordination costs. A standard approach of
the coordination issue is measuring the ethnic dimension. According to our theoretical
framework, ethnic diversity should make a rebellion more costly and hence less likely
to occur. Collier (1998) also indicates that ethnic diversity should follow a non-
monotonous relationship due to common problems of asymmetric information. Each
individual has not the incentive to join the rebellion even if one shares one’s ideas
and is likely to free-ride on the others ﬁghting. Furthermore, individuals have to
ﬁght before they can see the results of the struggle, which creates a time-consistency
problem. Consequently, it is costly to coordinate the uprising. One way for leaders
to overcome the problems of collective action is then to create a suﬃciently high
degree of trust by reinforcing the ethnic identity among potential ﬁghters. In a very
diverse society, identities are so numerous that it makes much harder to mobilize large
numbers of people than in homogenous societies. Diﬀerent measurements of diversity
and polarization have been tested and are discussed in section 3.4.2. However, only
the proportion of people of 5 years and more who speak an indigenous language is
presented in the baseline regressions.
14Density as a coordination cost : Coordination costs will also be approached with pop-
ulation density, transformed into logarithm. Contrary to Collier (1998) who uses
population size as a proxy, we believe population density should better capture the
diﬃculty to coordinate the rebellion. A denser population is assumed to ease the
mobilisation of supporters by the rebel leader.
Size as a proxy for relative eﬃciency : Following our theoretical model, the rebel
leader will have a strictly positive number of supporters provided D < ˆ D, which
corresponds to θ >
(γ+c)
2φ in (8) and (12). It is unfortunately impossible to have data
on the relative eﬃciency of the rebels at the municipal level. However, we could ﬁrst
identify a general trend that could have made the uprising possible. Using data from
Singer et al. (1972), we could observe a clear decreasing trend in the ratio of military
expenditure over GDP between 1987 and 1991. Comparing to an average of 5% in
the preceding 16 years, the ration decreases from 6.4% in 1987 to 2.14% in 1991.
Second, the processes of trade openness and democratization since the beginning of
the eighties made the deterrence action less coercive, suggesting that the suﬃcient
condition to deter rebellion did not hold anymore after the end of the eighties. 9
Furthermore, the communication skills of the rebel leader el subcommandante Marcos
has enabled the rebellion to gain some international support and increase the political
cost for the Mexican government to ‘nip the uprising in the bud’. Another dimension
that could aﬀect the relative eﬃciency of the rebels compared to the deterrence action
of the central government is the presence of some geographic features, known in the
literature as providing military advantages to rebels. Given the Lacandone Selva in
Chiapas, such geographical dimension is likely to play an important role. Unfortu-
natly, no quantitative data could be found. However, comparing diﬀerent maps, it
appears that the presence of forests is associated with large municipalities. Therefore,
we will control for the size of each municipality to capture the eﬀect of geographical
advantages for the rebellion. Such a control variable, transformed into logarithm, is
therefore expected to have a positive eﬀect on the probability to support the rebellion.
However, one should note that this variable is likely to capture even more than this
geographical advantage. 10
3.2.3 Control variables
We also introduce control variables to test the robustness of our results in section
3.4.2. Such control variables and other qualitative information will allow us to test
9Empirically, democracy is found to have a non-monotonic eﬀect on the risk of conﬂict. Evidence
from Ellingsten (2000), Hegre et al. (2001), Reynal-Querol (2002) and Sambanis (2001) suggests
partly democratic regimes are more prone to violent conﬂicts than either highly democratic or
highly autocratic societies.
10As a negative proxy for the presence of forests, we test the proportion of arable land. The
average altitude of each municipality computed on the basis of locality data has been introduced as
a proxy for the strategic advantage that could oﬀer the presence of mountains. Without changing
the results presenting in section 3.4, both variables are far from signiﬁcant in all our speciﬁcations.
15our results against alternative hypothesis. Most variables are computed from INEGI
data for the year 1990:
- The literacy rate (Education) is the proportion of people of 15 years and more who
can write and read.
- Primary is the proportion of people who have completed primary education.
- Secondary is the proportion of people who have completed secondary education.
- An infrastructure index is computed by averaging three ratios i.e. the proportion of
people with access to electricity, to running water and to drainage services.
- Migration will be measured by either the proportion of people born in another
country or living ﬁve years before in another country.
- The importance of the agricultural dimension is measured by either the proportion
of land or labour used in agricultural or forestry activities. The proportion of arable
land is also tested.
3.3 Dealing with endogeneity
A key issue in our empirical work is the treatment of the potential endogeneity prob-
lem. This is particularly true with the Inequality variable. We suspect the level of
inequality to be correlated with some unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities,
such as the quality of the local political system and notably its openness to minority
groups. On the one hand, Reynal-Querol (2005) suggests that the inclusiveness of the
political systems has a signiﬁcant impact on the risk of conﬂict. If such inclusiveness
is correlated with our Inequality variables, the results will be biased. On the other
hand, this might be highly relevant in our case. Local governance has been recognized
as playing a very determinant role in some municipalities within the state of Puebla
(Ward and Rodr´ ıguez, 1999; Vanderbush, 1999). The adopted strategy is to ﬁnd valid
instruments, test them with the two-step procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988) and
use conditional maximum likelihood method of estimation to cope with the potential
endogeneity problem.
Finding a valid instrument is not an easy task. A natural candidate is the lagged value
of the Inequality coeﬃcient from 1970. Income inequality in 1970 is strongly correlated
with the Gini coeﬃcient of 1990 and uncorrelated with the dependent variable of
1990. 11 To be a valid instrument, we could assume that the Gini coeﬃcient of 1970
is not correlated with the unobserved local governance of 1990, as enough political
cycles and changes in political representativeness should have occurred in the 20-year
period. However, we cannot be certain that such an assumption will necessarily hold.
Despite the huge political changes known in Mexico over that period, it might well
be the case that the process of democratization has not reached some parts of South
Mexico. Twenty years might not be long enough to ensure suﬃcient changes in the
political inclusiveness in some municipalities of our sample. Two other instrumental
11The risk of weak instrument should be low as the coeﬃcient of the lagged Gini coeﬃcient in
the linear projection of the Gini coeﬃcient on the exogenous variables of the baseline regression is
highly signiﬁcant (0.406***).
16variables will be introduced. First, we construct a measure of inequality spillovers
by multiplying the Gini coeﬃcient of each municipality by a weighting matrix whose
weight decreases with distance while is nul for the concerned municipality. 12 Such a
computation should reﬂect the way inequality in surrounding municipalities will aﬀect
the level of inequality in the concerned municipality. Such an index is signiﬁcatively
correlated with the level of inequality of the concerned municipality but is unlikely
to hold any relationship with the local governance, being completely exogeneously
determined. Furthermore, it does not appear to aﬀect the dependent variable by other
channels than the Gini coeﬃcient. The second alternative instrument is given by the
proportion of people not wearing shoes in 1970. Such an indicator was collected as a
critical measure of relative deprivation in 1970 by INEGI and is strongly correlated
with the Gini coeﬃcient of 1990. However, due to a general improvement between
1970 and 1990 with regards to the wearing of shoes, the relationship with the local
governance of 1990 has fade away overtime.
Similar problem of endogeneity might be raised with the introduction of the income
per capita. An equivalent strategy is adopted. We will introduce not only the lagged
value of this indicator as an instrumental variable but also another alternative, the
closest distance to the US. In the tradition of geographical economics, the distance
to a larger market should have a negative impact on the income per capita. Not
surprisingly, the distance to the most Southern location of Texas, ranging between 500
and 1300 kilometers by air (and up to 1600 kilometers by land) is highly signiﬁcant
in the linear projection of the income per capita on other variables. Exogenously
determined, such a geographical variable is unlikely to be correlated with the local
governance of the municipalities.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Does inequality make us rebel?
Contrary to results obtained from cross-country analysis, income inequality measured
by the Gini coeﬃcient at municipal level is signiﬁcant in motivating people to support
the rebellion. The Gini coeﬃcient in regression (1) of table 2 is positive and highly
signiﬁcant. The corresponding average partial eﬀect accounts for 0.013. Regression (2)
tests the income per capita apart from the Gini coeﬃcient. Like Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2004), we found a negative coeﬃcient. 13 Being negatively correlated, both results
are likely to be downward biased by the omision of one or the other variable. When
12To avoid the bias introduced by the discountinuity of space in our sample, we add 17 other
states in South Mexico (the lower half of the country in light hatching in ﬁgure 3), i.e. covering
about 1825 municipalities and 25 million people to compute the inequality spillovers and then, select
the subsample corresponding to our 402 municipalities.
13Introducing the tax revenue (excluding federal transfers) by municipality, as an alternative
proxy for the potential loot the rebel leader can get from warfare, is insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, it
does not alter signiﬁcantly the results of other variables in the diﬀerent speciﬁcations presented in
this section.
17introduced in the same regression (3), both coeﬃcients are likely to better distinguish
the opportunity cost eﬀect from the looting one but become insigniﬁcant. However,
we might suspect these variables to be correlated with the unobserved quality of
local governance. 14 Using the lagged Gini coeﬃcient, the inequality spillovers and
the proportion of people not wearing shoes in 1970 as valid instruments, the Rivers
and Vuong (1988) test conﬁrms our intuition that the Gini coeﬃcient is likely to be
endogenous. Instrumentalizing the Gini coeﬃcient increases the eﬀect of inequality on
the probability to support the rebellion. Regressions (4), (5) and (6) give a coeﬃcient
between 13.22 and 13.74 and an average partial eﬀect between 1.5 and 4.5. Regression
(7) conﬁrms our results when using all instrumental variables. 15 As far as the
income per capita is concerned, the Rivers and Vuong (1988) test gives mixed results
depending on the instrument adopted. As a matter of comparison, we could note that
instrumenting the income per capita in regression (2) would increase the magnitude
of the eﬀect (-1.614*** using the lagged income and -2.345*** using the shortest
distance to the US). However, it might well be the case that the endogeneity bias is
magniﬁed due to the non-inclusion of the Gini coeﬃcient as an explanatory variable.
Regression (8) gives the results when both the Gini coeﬃcient and the income per
capita are instrumented. The coeﬃcient of the income per capita is closed to the one
obtained when it is introduced as an exogenous variable. One technical diﬀerence is
that it makes the maximization of the conditional log-likelihood function much more
complex. Including other explanatory variables breaks the convergence procedure
down. We will adopt the speciﬁcation of regression (7) in the rest of the paper.
16 Cautiousness in the interpretation of the coeﬃcient of the income per capita is
required. The positive sign obtained, when controlling for the Gini coeﬃcient should
not be seen as a counter-evidence to most cross-country ﬁndings that war is more
likely to occur in poor countries. Nevertheless, it could suggest that within these
poor countries, the way wealth is spatially distributed may matter as far as conﬂict
prevention is concerned.
Results presented in this section has been obtained when ethnicity is simply proxied
by the percentage of people speaking an indigenous language. In line with the theory
14The risk of approximate multicollinearity is pretty weak. The Gini coeﬃcient is negatively
correlated with the income per capita with a coeﬃcient of -0.61 (-0.76 when the second variable is
transformed into logarithm).
15The overidentifying restriction test sheds some doubts about our choice of instrumental vari-
ables. However, this test is an approximation in the case of non-linear estimations such as our
Probit speciﬁcations.
16Similar results are obtained in regression (9) where no logarithm transformation for the income
per capita, the size and the population density. As veriﬁed for all speciﬁcations, not using this
transformation only decreases the magnitude of the de-logged variables and slightly improve the
signiﬁcance of the ‘ethnicity’ variables. All results are also consistent with the results obtained
under the Linear Probability Model estimation. Although it is not well speciﬁed as about one third
of probability responses stand outside the unit interval, it provides an interesting starting point
as estimated coeﬃcients should be consistent with the average partial eﬀects obtained by Probit
estimations.
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19considering this variable as a coordination cost, ethnic diversity increases the risk of
conﬂict. Nevertheless, a too diverse society makes an uprising too costly to coordinate
and explains the negative sign obtained for its square. Such a result is consistent with
Collier (1998) who shows that highly diverse societies might be safer than less frac-
tionalized societies, beyond a quite low level of diversity. We will discuss alternative
measurements of the ethnic dimension. However, the signiﬁcant eﬀect found for the
Gini coeﬃcient is highly robust, as it will be unaltered in all alternative speciﬁcations.
A denser population decreases the coordination cost and has a positive coeﬃcient. In
most cases, the size of the municipalities signiﬁcantly increases the probability to sup-
port the rebellion. This variable could reﬂect the importance of physical geography
such as the presence of forests, although it is also likely to capture other unobserved
diﬀerences across municipalities.
Finally, although argued to be a much more relevant factor of conﬂict, the polarization
index does not bear as much explanatory power as the Gini coeﬃcient. 17 Assuming
all variables exogeneous, the coeﬃcient of the polarization index is insigniﬁcant. No
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is found when the same variables are estimated considering the
polarization index as endogeneous. So poor results might be due to the unfavorable
feature of the small size of municipalities. With small geographical units, polarization
might matter less than the feeling of injustice engendered by overall inequality.
3.4.2 Robustness checks
Ethnicity is a diﬃcult issue to handle in the literature on conﬂicts, as it appears to
be malleable both over time and over space. Therefore, our measure of ethnicity as
a proportion of people speaking an indigenous language may seem too simple. We
identify in our sample about 37 linguistic groups such as the Tzetzales, the Tzotziles,
the Choles, the Tojolabales, the Zoques and the Mams. 18 Such ethnic diversity
would make rebellion a costly strategy to follow for the rebel leader. In our case,
South Mexico appears to be ethnically very diverse. In addition to the 85% of the
population studied who only speak Spanish, 15% of the population are composed of
36 groups whose members speak an indigenous language but which only represent
between 0 and 6% of the sample, taken separately. However, the ethnic landscape is
very much contrasted when looking at municipal data. For instance, people speaking
Tzetzal represent 1.8% in our sample but 80.6% in Chil´ on (Chiapas); Tzotzil, 2.8%
but 78.3% in Chalchihuit´ an (Chiapas); Chol, 1% but 61.48% in Salto de Agua (Chia-
pas), Mexicano o nahuati, 6.6% but 93% in Zoquitlan (Puebla) and Mixteco, 1% but
17This index was evaluated at the two particular values of α suggested by Esteban and Ray (1994)
and reﬂecting diﬀerent degrees of ‘polarization sensitivity’, i.e. α = 1 and α = 1.6. From Rivers
and Vuong (1988) testing procedure and using the lagged variable from 1970, the polarization index
does not seem to be aﬀected by any endogenous bias.
18With the exception of the simple ratio of people of 5 years and more speaking an indigenous
language, no detailed information has been found for the year 1990. Assuming that relative diﬀer-
ences between municipalities in ethnic distinctions is stable over a 10-year period, we use data from
1980 to compute the various indexes of ethnic diversity and polarization.
2083% in Chigmecatitl´ an (Puebla). Considering only the proportion of people speaking
an indigenous language could also overlook a situation where two groups are polar-
ized within a municipality. Therefore, we test the robustness of our results to several
diversity and polarization indexes (details of computation are given in annex B). As
illustrated in the ﬁrst case in regression (1) of table 3, measurements of diversity such
as the indexes of ethnic fragmentation (Taylor and Hudson, 1972), of peripheral di-
versity (Desmet et al., 2005), of maximum potential social fragmentation (Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 2004) and a “Dominance” dummy indicating whether one linguistic group
other than the only Spanish-speaking one is in majority do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
probability to support the rebellion. As shown in regression (2) of table 3 for the most
standard one, this is also the case for the polarization indexes of Esteban and Ray
(1994) and Reynal-Querol (2001). With the sole exception of the index of peripheral
polarization which gives the expected non-monotonic shape and similar results pre-
sented in regression (3) of table 3, the simple ratio of people speaking an indigenous
language performs better than other more sophisticated indexes. This might seem
puzzling but could have a straightforward explanation. 19 Many anthropologists have
indeed witnessed the emergence of a shared identity as Indian, among ethnic groups
such as the Tzetzales, the Tzotziles and the Tojolabales (Collier, 1995; Mattiace, 2001;
Favre, 2002; Speed, 2002). The emergence of a common identity among Indians could
have been a necessary condition for overcoming problems of asymmetric information
in coordinating the uprising. 20 The anthropologist hypothesis reconciles the ob-
served ethnic diversity with Collier’s prediction. Indeed, high diversity within South
Mexico can actually explain why social movements faced great diﬃculties to stabi-
lize their membership. From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, many social organizations
emerged, under the impulsion of the Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garc´ ıa. These organizations
had the common characteristics to be very locally based and to compete with each
other (Favre, 2002). They were so numerous that Indians and peasants could join a
formation with the expectation of quasi-immediate beneﬁts and join another, other-
wise. The only way to stabilize membership in such circumstances was to oﬀer beneﬁts
from funds of public policies but with the obvious risk of becoming a political weapon
of the dominant party, the Partido Revolucionar´ ıo Institucional (PRI). Consequently,
no armed forces could have been organized due to collective action problems. In addi-
tion to the cost of deterrence action, what makes military mobilization possible could
have been a re-deﬁnition of identity among Indians in South Mexico thanks to the
important work of consciousness-raising, exercised locally by external actors such as
Marxist activists, liberalization theologians and the pre-cited Bishop. Furthermore,
all these alternative measurements of ethnicity strengthen the robustness of our re-
sults. Consistently with our theoretical framework, the Gini coeﬃcient measured at
19In this case, the well-behaved form of the index of peripheral polarization could be due to the
fact this index is actually closer to the simple ratio of people speaking an indigenous language.
20Although naturally bearing the function of anonymity, the wearing of mask can be seen as a
clever way to represent an indigenous movement but suﬃciently inclusive to avoid the coordination
costs involved by a possible ethnic identiﬁcation.
21municipal level always signiﬁcantly increases the probability to support the rebellion
in South Mexico.
Alternative explanations have been found in the literature on conﬂicts in South Mex-
ico. First, contrary to what has been claimed by Mexican oﬃcials about the instru-
mentalization of the conﬂict by migrants from other countries such as Guatemala, the
proportion of people born in another country is far from signiﬁcance in regression (4)
of table 3. The same is true when the impact of migrants is estimated with the per-
centage of people that used to live in another country in 1985, i.e. ﬁve years before.
Second, the unique measurement of income inequality might be seen as too restrictive
to reﬂect the potential role of inequality in conﬂict. Income certainly matters as an
indicator of relative deprivation, but might not be enough to capture the complexity
of the decision that leads to support the rebellion. Unequal access to education might
play an important role in motivating people to rebel and is proxied by the percentage
of literate people in each municipality. Access to education, measured by the literacy
rate, is not signiﬁcant in regression (5). Similar outcome is obtained when access to
education is proxied by the percentage of people with primary education. The non-
signiﬁcance of education might be explained by a general progress in literacy and
primary schooling in previous decades. 21 On the contrary, the percentage of people
with secondary education has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability to support the re-
bellion. As indicated in regression (6), the sign of its coeﬃcient is positive suggesting
the more educated you are, the more prone to rebel you would be. A possible ex-
planation could be the mismatch between improved skills and job opportunities. The
lack of well-paid job opportunities could be a source of frustration for an increasingly
skilled workforce. Such a factor of conﬂict is not captured by the theoretical model
as unemployment and heterogeneity among workers are not considered. Although
such a conjecture requires further theoretical and empirical investigations, a similar
argument is theoretically supported by Azam (2005) in another context to explain
motivates for suicide-bombings. An additional dimension for relative deprivation, i.e.
access to infrastructure is proxied by averaging the proportions of households with
access to electricity, running water and drainage services for each municipality. This
constructed index signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability to support the rebellion and has
an expected negative sign. Some authors have also presented the Chiapas conﬂict as
the results of a sectoral crisis. The agricultural and forestry sector would have been
particularly harmed by trade reforms undertaken since the mid-eighties. However,
regressions (8) and (9) indicate that the coeﬃcients of agricultural and forestry land
or the proportion of the population working in such activities are insigniﬁcant.
Finally, other factors could be missing in the analysis due to data unavailability. First,
uneven land distribution has often been pointed out as responsible for protest in rural
areas. South Mexico is no exception. Most of the literature presents the land issue as
an opposition between a few big landowners who would own the majority of the land
21Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) provide a similar explanation in their study of the diﬀerences
of income distribution among 33 developing countries.
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23at the expense of the whole Indian population. Furthermore, the 1992 amendment of
article 27 of the Mexican constitution, aiming at attracting new private investment
and withdrawing the peasant rights to claim land, is considered as a source of determi-
nant recruitment for rebel movements. However, although the article 27 amendment
has certainly eased the mobilization of rebels, this image of opposition between big
landowners and the whole Indian population might have been relevant until the mid-
eighties but not anymore in the nineties. It is true that private landowners received
the support of the federal and military-lead state governments through forced migra-
tion, expropriation of land, division of populations and quasi immunity for the private
guards employed by the cattle ranchers. However, after the eighties, there has been
a multiplication of small private landowners but not a concentration of land in a few
hands. Favre (2002) shows numerically that the average surface of biggest properties
has diminished from 1970 to 1993 while the average surface of the smallest properties
also diminished due to demographic pressure. Moreover, land owned collectively by
the community seemed to have multiplied in sensitive areas of South Mexico. It does
not mean that the land issue is not a crucial one but the problem is likely to be the
non-respect of property rights, pointing to the local misgovernance rather than land
distribution per se. Well, the way the potential endogeneity of the Gini coeﬃcient is
treated, should control for the unobserved eﬀect of political exclusion. Naturally, the
construction of an index incorporating, e.g. the ratios of minority groups in govern-
mental bodies, civil services, the army and the police could better assess the partial
eﬀect of the political dimension. Second, trade of high-value commodities has often
been central in ﬁnancing war and economic agendas have often substituted political
aims at the expense of the most vulnerable citizens. 22 However, the ﬁnancing ca-
pacity of the rebellion is likely to be captured by the income per capita, reﬂecting the
so-called looting eﬀect of our theoretical model.
4 Conclusion
By extending the theoretical model of Grossman (1999), the present paper sheds light
on the need to study both relative and absolute deprivation simultaneously in the
analysis of conﬂict. On the one hand, income inequality measured by the Gini co-
eﬃcient at municipal level has signiﬁcatively aﬀected the support to the rebellion in
South Mexico. Therefore, cautiousness is required in the interpretation of the results
obtained by (myopic) cross-country analysis that conclude that inequality does not
play any role in motivating people to enter into armed conﬂicts. The literature has
had huge implications on the way institutions such as the World Bank assess the risk
of conﬂict and elaborate policies for conﬂict prevention and resolution. This paper
22No particular lootable resource has been identiﬁed in South Mexico. It might be the case that
such a variable matters less than in other conﬂicts, such as the ones described in Africa. The
uprising in South Mexico appears to be a ‘cheap’ ﬁght to ﬁnance seeing the reported sources of
ﬁnancing the struggle. Harvey (1998, 167) indicates that weapons were mainly bought on the black
market with “money that had previously been used for religious ﬁestas”.
24suggests, at least, that a one-ﬁts-all approach to conﬂict could neglect economic in-
equality as an important factor. Contrary to Collier (2000)’s policy recommendations,
reducing inequalities could well be eﬀective in some cases to promote civil peace, basic
condition for sustainable development. On the other hand, the theoretical framework
suggests that a rise in income per capita could well exacerbate the risk of conﬂict,
as it could increase the potential loot of the rebel leader. Such a result is supported
by our empirical analysis of South Mexican municipalities. As a word of cautious-
ness, it does not contradict the general consensus obtained by cross-country analysis
following which conﬂict is more likely in poor countries. However, it does suggest
that the way growth is spatially distributed within countries under risk of conﬂict,
does matter to prevent new deadly confrontations. This is certainly a promising path
for further research. Finally, by verifying the robustness of the results to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations, the paper also emphasizes the complexity of ethnic identiﬁcation. In
the present case, the anthropologist hypothesis following which the emergence of a
common identity across diﬀerent ethno-linguistic groups was a necessary condition
for group mobilization ﬁnds some empirical support. Nevertheless, the limited scope
of this analysis constitutes an obvious constraint for being more aﬃrmative on the
issue.
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29A Alternative speciﬁcation of the theoretical model
An alternative speciﬁcation would be a situation where the government is only con-
cerned about the local producers, i.e. the local elite. The same sequential game is
played and the government problem is written as follows:
Q = (1 − τ)λY − wlL
s.t. τλY ≥ swlL + φD
As in the model of section 2, the government will decide on the levels of deterrence
action, of taxes and subsidy.
D =
(γ + c)
4αθφ2 A
1
1−α

α
γ
(1 + s)
 α
1−α
(13)
s =
c + γ
4θφ
− 1 and s ≥ 0 if θ ≤
c + γ
4φ
τ =
α + 1
2
− (1 − α)
2αθφ
c + γ
and τ ≥ 0 if θ ≤
(α + 1)(c + γ)
4α(1 − α)φ
The only change compared to the model presented in section 2 is the fact that the
parameters for which the subsidy is positive, are more restrictive. Such a result is
quite natural as the government is not benevolent anymore so that the social return
on subsidy should be lower. In such a theoretical framework, the subsidy could never
be a valuable strategy to deter war when the war is feasible. The hard stick will
always be preferred to the soft manner when the local government is not benevolent.
Figure 5: Feasible intervals do not overlap
30The same result is obtained when the government tax production rather than proﬁts.
Although this result might be insightful and raises the hypothesis that more corrupted
government should never use a distributive policy as a strategy to deter rebellion, we
do not consider this case as very insightful for our empirical work.
B Data sources and computation
Data come from diﬀerent population census and the database provided by the the
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica Geograf´ ıa y Informat´ ıca (INEGI). To ensure a high
degree of comparability between data from 1970 and 1990, a new municipality (San
Juan Cancuc) in Chiapas has been incorporated into its former one (Tenejapa).
1. Gini coeﬃcient: INEGI provides for each municipality the number of people
by income groups, deﬁned on the basis of the minimum salary (including no
income). The Gini coeﬃcient is calculated with grouped data so that no account
of the inequality within the intervals of income is taken. As suggested by Chen
et al. (1991), the midpoints were used for the closed intervals. Simulations indeed
suggest that using midpoints to estimate Lorenz curves (from which the Gini
coeﬃcient is derived) does not create bias. For the open-ended interval at the
top of the income distribution, the mean income for the interval was set at
30 percent above the lower bound. The lowest interval was set at 80 percent
below the highest bound. Both values are recommended by Chen et al. (1991).
Income intervals are deﬁned in terms of minimum salary for 1990. With the sole
exception of one municipality in the state of Guerrero, Acapulco de Juarez with a
minimum salary of 10,309$ pesos on January 1, 1990, the minimum salary in the
remaining 401 municipalities accounts for 8,405$ pesos. The formula provided
by Champernowe and Cowell (1998) is used for computation:
Gini =
1
2n2¯ y
n X
i=1
n X
j=1
|(yi − yj)| (14)
where yi is the income attributed to individuals i ; n is the number of people
living in the concerned municipality.
2. Income Polarization index: The same method has been used to deal with grouped
data. Computation is based on Esteban and Ray (1994):
ER = K
n X
i=1
n X
j=1
Π
1+α
i Πj|yi − yj| (15)
where Πi is the proportion of the active population who declare to receive the
income of the group i.
3. Income per capita is obtained by the ratio of the sum of the income of all the
individuals (in the active population of the concerned municipality) divided by
total population:
Income per capita =
Pn
i=1 YiΠi
nk
(16)
31where Yi is the income attributed to the group i
4. Baseline ‘Ethnicity’ variable: Proportion of people of 5 years old and more who
speak an indigenous language.
5. The Ethnolinguistic Fractionization index (ELF) follows Taylor and Hudson
(1972):
ELF = 1 −
n X
i=1
Π2
i (17)
where Πi is the proportion of people that speak language i (religion i when
applied to religious fractionization). This index reﬂects the probability that two
randomly selected individuals within a municipality belong to the same linguistic
group.
6. The Reynal-Querol index is naturally given by Reynal-Querol (2001):
RQ = 1 −
n X
i=1

0.5 − Πi
0.5
2
Πi (18)
7. The Peripheral Diversity/Polarization index follows Desmet et al. (2005):
PD(DOW) =
n X
i=1
(Π
1+α
i τoi + Πi)Πoτoi (19)
where Πo is the proportion of people only speaking the dominant language (Span-
ish in our case) ; Πi is the proportion of people speaking the language i ; τoi is
the distance between languages. When α < 0, you obtain the index of periph-
eral diversity (PD), when α > 0, you obtain the index of peripheral polarization
(DOW).
These indexes should better reﬂect the dominant position of the only-Spanish-
speaking people, not necessarily in terms of number (other linguistic groups are
in a few cases in majority) but in terms of social, political and economic powers.
This group is therefore assumed to be the dominant group in all municipalities.
Ideally and as suggested by Desmet et al. (2005), the measure of distance would
be based on the proportion of cognates between languages. To our knowledge,
such information is unavailable for the diﬀerent languages of our sample. There-
fore, the ‘distance’ between languages was arbitrarily assumed to be equal to 0.5
between two indigenous languages and 1 between any of them and the Spanish
language. The value 1 is in line with the distance suggested by Desmet et al.
(2005) between Mayan and Spanish. The value 0.5 is chosen arbitrarily.
8. The Maximum Potential Social Fractionisation (MPSF) follows Collier (1998,
footnote 8), i.e. the product of ethnic and religious diversity indexes, plus
whichever index is the greater.
9. Control variables are given in section 3.2.3.
32C Descriptive statistics
Table 4: Variables related to baseline regressions
Variables Obs. Mean st.deviation Minimum Maximum
Supportive 402 0.0746 0.2631 0 1
Gini 402 0.6054 0.1261 0.3268 0.9533
Inc. per capita* 402 2035.164 1106.341 228.553 7115.858
Ethnicity 402 0.2158 0.2918 0.0012 0.8706
Size* 402 418.723 748.372 8.93 1061.6
Density* 402 115.633 204.386 2.603 2125.147
Note: * means that the variable has been transformed into logarithm before being introduced in regressions
Table 5: Control variables
Variables Obs. Mean st.deviation Minimum Maximum
Ethnolinguistic Frac. 402 0.2054 0.1969 0.0018 0.6682
Polarization Index 402 0.0668 0.0558 0.0009 0.1648
Peripheral Polarization 402 0.1334 0.1724 0.0009 0.8698
Literacy rate 402 0.3206 0.1432 0.0619 0.8086
Primary 402 0.0899 0.0326 0.0181 0.1997
Secondary 402 0.0391 0.0234 0 0.2129
migration(born) 402 0.0023 0.0094 0 0.0969
migration(5 years) 402 0.0012 0.0034 0 0.0461
Infrastructure 402 0.3662 0.1564 0.007 0.8359
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